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NO HARM, NO FOUL: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
STRUGGLES WITH THE “INJURY-IN-FACT” 
REQUIREMENT TO ARTICLE III STANDING IN 
DATA BREACH CLASS ACTIONS 
Abstract: On February 6, 2017, in Beck v. McDonald, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the increased risk of future identity 
theft created by two data breaches was too speculative to constitute an injury-
in-fact for the purposes of Article III standing. The court surveyed the split be-
tween its sister circuits and determined that, without allegations that a thief 
deliberately targeted information, misused, or attempted to misuse that per-
sonal information, the risk of identity theft was not sufficiently high so as to 
meet the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing. This Comment ex-
amines the Fourth Circuit’s holding and argues that the deepening split among 
circuits leaves plaintiffs uncertain about how to adequately plead injury-in-
fact. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following a data breach, victims that bring a lawsuit typically claim 
three types of injuries: (1) actual financial harm, (2) actual identity theft or 
misuse of personal information without financial harm, and (3) an increased 
risk of future identity theft or other misuse.1 Courts regularly find standing 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Robert D. Fram et al., Standing in Data Breach Cases: A Review of Recent Trends, 16 CLASS 
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 1054, 1055 (Sept. 25, 2017). “A data breach is a confirmed incident in 
which sensitive, confidential or otherwise protected data has been accessed and/or disclosed in an 
unauthorized fashion.” Margaret Rouse, Data Breach, TECHTARGET (Dec. 2017), http://search
security.techtarget.com/definition/data-breach [https://perma.cc/VC8W-FEVA]; see also William 
Roberds & Stacey L. Schreft, Data Breaches and Identity Theft, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 918, 919–
20 (2009) (describing the prevalence of data breaches). Data breaches may involve the theft of per-
sonal health information, personally identifiable information, trade secrets, or intellectual property. 
See Fram et al., supra at 1055 (discussing lawsuits following “hacking, point-of-sale attacks, [and] 
hardware theft”). Irrespective of how much money companies spend on cybersecurity defense, data 
breaches continue to occur and millions of individuals have their personal information stolen, espe-
cially in the cybersecurity context. See Selena Larson, Why Hacks Like Equifax Will Keep Happen-
ing, CNN TECH (Sept. 29, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/29/technology/business/equifax-
hack-2017-cyberattacks/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q3W3-3B9Q] (discussing the recent Equifax 
hack and other targeted data breaches, noting that, in the first half of 2017 alone, “almost 2 billion 
records were lost or stolen globally”); Michael Riley et al., The Equifax Hack Has the Hallmarks of 
State-Sponsored Pros, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2017-09-29/the-equifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros [https://
perma.cc/7TCC-TVRG] (discussing the recent Equifax hack of 143 million customers’ personal 
information). Data breaches are particularly frustrating for victims because they often cannot find the 
perpetrator who actually stole their information. See Riley et al., supra (commenting on how victims 
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where a plaintiff alleges actual financial harm or misuse of personal infor-
mation.2 Courts struggle to find standing, however, where a plaintiff merely 
alleges an increased risk of future harm as a result of a data breach.3 That 
struggle is disconcerting to victims because an increased risk of future iden-
tity theft is the most commonly alleged injury in lawsuits following data 
breaches.4 This Comment discusses the current split among the circuits 
                                                                                                                           
don’t know who stole their personal information). Victims of data breaches are left in a constant state 
of anxiety that their personal information will be manipulated and fraudulently used against them. Id. 
Thus, potential plaintiffs have no recourse but to sue the companies that they trusted with their per-
sonal information. See Nick Beatty, Note, Standing Room Only: Solving the Injury-in-Fact Problem 
for Data Breach Plaintiffs, 2016 BYU L. REV. 1289, 1290 (discussing the typical data breach class 
action, in which plaintiffs sue their once-trusted companies for “negligence in protecting [their] fi-
nancial information”); see, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017) (detailing 
plaintiffs’ suit against a hospital for failure to take adequate precautions to keep their personal infor-
mation secure in wake of data breach). Being forced to sue a once-trusted company is potentially the 
most frustrating part of a data breach for victims because there often was an expectation that the 
defendant companies would keep that personal information safe and secure. See Pat Regnier & Su-
zanne Woolley, Thank You for Calling Equifax. Your Business Is Not Important to Us, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-14/thank-you-
for-calling-equifax-your-business-is-not-important-to-us [https://perma.cc/5UZ7-LC7C] (discussing 
the inherent anxiety victims of data breaches face, commenting, “you shouldn’t need to do a damn 
thing to keep your credit information safe”). Data breaches can also arise even where individuals did 
not voluntarily enter into a relationship with the hacked company, thus causing further headaches for 
data breach victims. See id. (discussing the frustration surrounding the 2017 Equifax, Inc. hack, not-
ing “what makes the situation especially awful is that you never had much choice about entering into 
a relationship with Equifax”). 
 2 WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBERSECURITY (2017): LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, 
CU*ANSWERS, 18–20 (May 24, 2017), http://nascus.org/Cyber17/handouts/Sickels%20pt2%20whats
%20new.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C24-Z4VX] [hereinafter WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBERSECURITY]; 
Fram et al., supra note 1, at 1055; J. Thomas Richie, Data Breach Class Actions, A.B.A. BUS. 
LITIG. COMMITTEE NEWSL., Winter 2015, at 1, 10–11; see, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Sec. 
Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014) (finding standing “sufficient at [the] 
pleading stage” where customers whose credit card information was stolen alleged unlawful 
charges, inability to pay bills, and new, unauthorized credit card fees); Tierney v. Advocate Health 
& Hosps. Corp., No. 13 CV 6237, 2014 WL 5783333, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2014) (finding 
standing for named plaintiffs who alleged fraudulent account activity, but concluding the majority 
of plaintiffs did not have standing where they only alleged an increased risk of identity theft), aff’d 
on other grounds, 797 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 3 See Megan Dowty, Life Is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data 
Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686, 688 (2017) (noting that “courts’ rulings vary the 
most” in the injury-in-fact context for data breach class actions, and that plaintiffs mainly try to 
“allege injury through increased risk of identity theft or fraud . . . .”); Fram et al., supra note 1, at 
1057 (discussing the differences in precedent among federal courts). 
 4 Fram et al., supra note 1, at 1057; see, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (finding standing where plaintiffs alleged increased risk of injury following cyber 
hack); Beck, 848 F.3d at 267–68, 275 (declining to find standing where plaintiffs alleged increased 
risk of identity theft following theft of a laptop and pathology reports from hospital); Galaria v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding standing where 
plaintiffs alleged increased risk of identity theft following hack on Nationwide’s computer net-
work); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding 
standing where plaintiffs alleged increased risk of identity theft following hack of credit card in-
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concerning potential-future-injury theories of standing and further details 
the current lack of certainty regarding what constitutes injury-in-fact.5 Part I 
of this Comment discusses the background of standing in federal courts, the 
reasoning applied to standing considerations by other courts in data breach 
class action suits, and the procedural history of the recent Fourth Circuit 
case, Beck v. McDonald.6 Part II analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s discussion 
and ruling in Beck.7 Part III explains that, in the midst of the current circuit 
split, plaintiffs are left uncertain regarding how to adequately plead injury-
in-fact in data breach class actions.8 
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF BECK V. MCDONALD 
In federal court, before plaintiffs can proceed to argue the merits of 
their cases, they must first prove they have a cognizable stake in the litiga-
tion: this is considered having standing.9 To sufficiently prove that a plain-
tiff has standing, that plaintiff must demonstrate that they have suffered an 
injury.10 In the data breach context, there is currently no consensus regard-
ing whether merely having personal information stolen by a third party and, 
as a result, being at an increased risk of identity theft, is sufficient to estab-
lish standing.11 Some courts have ruled that an increased risk of identity 
theft, alone, is a sufficient injury to confer standing.12Other courts have 
been reluctant to take that position and instead require some evidence—
beyond the mere occurrence of a data breach—that financial harm is cer-
                                                                                                                           
formation from P.F. Chang’s); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 
2015) (finding standing where plaintiffs alleged increased risk of identity theft following hack of 
Neiman Marcus’s customers’ credit card numbers). 
 5 See infra notes 9–110 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 9–65 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 66–85 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 86–110 and accompanying text. 
 9 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983). Standing, put simply, is having a stake in the litiga-
tion. Id. 
 10 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)); see Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475, (1982) (“The 
exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those 
to whom it extends, is . . . restricted to litigants who can show ‘injury in fact’ resulting from the 
action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.”). 
 11 Compare Attias, 865 F.3d at 626 (finding standing where plaintiffs only alleged increased 
risk of future identity theft without any attempted or actual misuse of personal information), with 
Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (finding that plaintiffs lacked standing where they alleged only an increased 
risk of identity theft without pleading actual or attempted misuse of personal information). 
 12 See, e.g., Attias, 865 F.3d at 629 (noting that a substantial risk of harm “exists . . . . simply 
by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken”). 
2018] The “Injury-In-Fact” Requirement for Article III Standing 465 
tainly impending to recognize a plaintiff’s standing.13 Section A of this Part 
provides a brief introduction to federal standing and an overview of circuit 
courts’ struggle for homogeneity in data breach class actions.14 Section B 
discusses the procedural history of Beck, a recent Fourth Circuit case in-
volving allegations of violations of the Privacy Act and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) resulting from two data breaches.15 
A. Legal Background 
Federal courts have the constitutional authority to exercise the judicial 
power of the United States.16 Courts are limited to hearing only cases and 
controversies in the exercise that power in an effort to maintain a balance of 
power between the branches of government.17 In order for a matter to meet 
the cases or controversies requirement, plaintiffs “must establish that they 
have standing to sue.”18 
Standing is a threshold requirement that determines whether a court is 
entitled to decide the merits of a dispute.19 Standing ensures that the federal 
courts do not overstep their proper judicial authority and waste judicial re-
sources by hearing frivolous claims, but rather focus on resolving actual 
disputes between adversaries.20 Relaxing the standing requirement would 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (noting that plaintiffs “uncovered no evidence that the 
information contained on the stolen laptop has been accessed or misused or that they have suffered 
identity theft, nor . . . that the thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private infor-
mation”). 
 14 See infra notes 16–41 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 42–65 and accompanying text. This Comment only discusses the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis of plaintiffs’ claims under the Privacy Act, not under the APA. Id. 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 
 17 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–501 (1975) (discussing the purpose of standing, 
noting that standing is concerned with properly limiting the role of courts in a democracy); Hay-
burn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 419 n.† (1792) (“[B]y the Constitution of the United States, the 
government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and . . . it is the duty 
of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on either.”); see also Scalia, supra note 9, 
at 882 (discussing the importance of Article III standing as a check on judicial power). 
 18 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560, (1992)). 
 19 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 20 Id. at 598 n.4 (noting the purpose of standing is to resolve “genuine controversies between 
adverse parties”); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“The province of 
the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.”). In the words of the late Justice Anto-
nin Scalia, the purpose of standing is to have federal courts adjudicate cases where the parties can 
adequately answer the question, “What’s it to you?” Scalia, supra note 9, at 882 (discussing the 
importance of Article III standing as a check on judicial power). Standing also serves other goals 
such as ensuring adverse litigants and promoting democracy. See Heather Elliot, The Functions of 
Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 465–501 (2008) (discussing other justifications for standing). 
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inappropriately expand judicial power.21 Thus, a federal court’s inquiry into 
standing must be laborious and thorough in every case in order to keep the 
courts within the bounds of its judicial role.22 
The Supreme Court has declared three “irreducible constitutional min-
im[a]” that plaintiffs must allege to establish standing: “(1) an injury-in-
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, 
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”23 To 
establish injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered 
an “actual or imminent” harm that is “concrete and particularized.”24 
In 2013, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court 
set forth the current understanding of the actual-or-imminent component of 
injury-in-fact.25 In Clapper, the plaintiffs challenged the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) because they were concerned their client-
communications were being unlawfully intercepted and surveilled by the 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60. The concept of standing is founded on the bedrock principle of 
separation of powers. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (“[Standing] developed in our case law to 
ensure that federal courts do not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.”). 
 22 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 498); see Jerett Yan, Standing as 
a Limitation on Judicial Review of Agency Action, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 593, 596 (2012) (explaining 
that one of the functions of Article III standing is to maintain a separation of powers, noting that, 
by “limiting the power of the judiciary . . . decisions are made by the accountable political branch-
es rather than the unaccountable judiciary”). A rigorous standing inquiry ensures that the judiciary 
does not step into the realm of policymaking and maintains adjudicative authority over violations 
of rights. Id. at 596–97. 
 23 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also Summers v. Earth 
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (stating, plaintiff “bears the burden of showing that [they 
have] standing”); Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Each element 
of standing ‘must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at successive stages of 
the litigation.’”). The requirements for standing do not change when plaintiffs bring class actions 
as opposed to individual actions. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 
F.3d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 2017); see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (“[N]amed plaintiffs 
who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury 
has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which 
they purport to represent.’”); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (“[I]f none of the 
named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy 
with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the 
class.”); see also Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
‘cases or controversies’ requirement is satisfied so long as a class representative has standing, 
whether in the context of a settlement or litigation class.”). 
 24 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). This requirement ensures that 
a plaintiff has “a personal stake” in the litigation, and it aims to ensure that the plaintiff bringing 
the suit is the proper representative of the grievance. Attias, 865 F.3d at 626. Courts consistently 
find that actual identity theft amounts to a “concrete and particularized injury.” Id. at 627. The 
issue that courts are split over, at least at the pleading stage, is whether allegations of a future risk 
of identity theft can confer standing. See id. 
 25 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. 
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government.26 The Supreme Court decided that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing to challenge FISA because they could not establish that their 
communications with their clients were intercepted or that interception by 
the government was imminent.27 
The Court acknowledged that the threat of injuries can satisfy Article 
III’s standing requirement so long as the threat is imminent, not merely possi-
ble, or objectively reasonable.28 The Court maintained that a threatened or 
future injury satisfied the imminence requirement if it is “certainly impend-
ing.”29 The Court was careful to point out that “certainly” would not require 
absolute certainty, and that standing could also be established by showing that 
a plaintiff reasonably incurred costs to mitigate or avoid a substantial risk of 
harm.30 Consequently, speculative injuries—injuries that require courts to 
connect chains of events together to reach—are insufficient to confer stand-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. at 406–07. FISA is a United States federal law that provides the guidelines and proce-
dures for the surveillance of foreign intelligence. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1881, 1881(a)–(g) (West 2018). 
 27 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410–11. The plaintiffs only alleged that they suspected that such in-
terceptions might have occurred but could not establish that they had in fact happened or were 
sufficiently likely to happen in the future. Id. The Supreme Court found that plaintiffs could not 
prove that they had any actual knowledge of the government’s surveillance practices. Id. Rather, 
the plaintiffs merely surmised about the intentions and plans of the government to intercept their 
clients’ communications. Id. 
 28 Id. at 409. Indeed, the Court recently reaffirmed that “the real risk of harm [can] satisfy” 
Article III’s standing requirements. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Clapper, 568 U.S. 398). 
Scholars have also pointed out that the Court has not been clear as to whether imminence refers to 
a time-based concept, a “probabilistic concept,” or both. See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason 
Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 179–80 (2012) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity in applying the imminence element of injury-in-fact); 
see also, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563, 564 (finding lack of imminence where the Court’s concern 
appeared to be that the injury was not precipitating immediately); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 
95, 102 (1983) (finding lack of imminence where injury was too “conjectural,” implying that the 
probability of the occurrence of harm was insufficient). 
 29 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. 
 30 Id. at 414 n.5 (“Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literal-
ly certain that the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, we have found standing 
based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably 
incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.”) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 
U.S. 139, 152–54 (2010)). There is debate amongst scholars as to whether there truly exists a 
“substantial harm” test, or whether it was merely included in Clapper as a way to secure Justice 
Kennedy’s vote for the majority. Nicholas Green, Standing in the Future: The Case for a Substan-
tial Risk Theory of “Injury in Fact” in Consumer Data Breach Class Actions, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
287, 302 (2017). The Supreme Court in Spokeo acknowledged that Clapper permits a substantial 
risk theory of injury, but some circuit courts are still reluctant to apply anything other than the 
certainly impending standard. Compare Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (acknowledging the viability 
of a substantial risk theory of injury in fact), with Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 797 (1st Cir. 
2014) (applying Clapper’s certainly impending standard, discussing the ambiguity in Clapper). To 
the extent the standard exists, the Beck court decided to apply it and determined that the plaintiffs 
could not establish standing to sue. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275. The Supreme Court has since clari-
fied, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, that a plaintiff can establish standing by satisfying 
either the “certainly impending” test or the “substantial risk” test. 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). 
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ing.31 The Court refused to find standing based on speculation about the deci-
sions of third parties, and found the plaintiffs’ alleged injury too abstract to be 
certainly impending.32 
In data breach cases, the injury-in-fact element is often the most con-
tentious.33 In that context, courts struggle to answer whether identity theft is 
certainly impending following a data breach.34 Most district courts have 
held that identity theft is not certainly impending after a data breach absent 
facts beyond the mere occurrence of the breach.35 Several circuit courts 
have held the same.36 Recently, however, a few circuit courts have found 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (finding that “allegations of possible 
future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art. III” and that only “certainly impending” inju-
ries “constitute injury-in-fact”); see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410 (finding plaintiffs theory of 
future injury too speculative to confer standing). 
 32 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. 
 33 See Beatty, supra note 1, at 1296 (noting the problems data breach plaintiffs face in trying 
to plead injury-in-fact, describing courts’ hesitations to find injury-in-fact where plaintiffs fail to 
allege any economic loss); see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing, Steel Co. v. Citizens for 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) (noting that the injury-in-fact component is the “[f]irst and 
foremost” element of standing). 
 34 Green, supra note 30, at 315 (noting a diverging view on Clapper’s standing requirements 
in the federal circuits); Richie, supra note 2, at 10 (examining Clapper’s effect on data breach 
litigation, noting that both before and after Clapper, courts split on finding standing for increased 
risk of future identity theft). In the class action context, the standing requirements are the same as 
they are for individual plaintiffs. See In re Horizon 846 F.3d at 634 (“‘[N]amed plaintiffs who 
represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has 
been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they 
purport to represent.’”) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357). 
 35 Fram et al., supra note 1, at 1057; see, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 
958 (D. Nev. 2015) (holding plaintiffs’ alleged risk of identity theft not sufficiently impending 
where plaintiffs failed to allege any “irregularity whatsoever” concerning their personal infor-
mation); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (finding lack of cog-
nizable injury where class action plaintiffs failed to allege actual identity theft, noting “[t]heir 
credit information and bank accounts [looked] the same . . . as they did prior to [the] data 
breach”); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 
3d 14, 26 (D.D.C 2014) (holding that only plaintiffs who alleged actual or attempted misuse of 
personal data had standing). 
 36 See, e.g., In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639 & n.19 (finding that the plaintiffs alleged a “mate-
rial risk of harm” where two unencrypted laptops were stolen containing “highly personal” infor-
mation, where it appeared the laptops were targeted for the personal information contained on 
them, and at least one named plaintiff alleged he had already been a victim of identity theft as a 
result of the breach); Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2012) (find-
ing that the plaintiff health care members’ increased risk of future identity theft was sufficient to 
confer standing in case of first impression where plaintiffs had alleged actual identity theft, but 
court refusing to address whether “speculative identity theft” would be sufficient to confer stand-
ing); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (refusing to find standing where 
plaintiff failed to identify “any incident in which her data has ever been accessed by an unauthor-
ized person,” noting that, in cases where circuits that have found standing, plaintiffs all alleged 
actual misuse). 
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standing based solely on the increased risk of identity theft, without allega-
tions of actual or attempted misuse of information.37 
The First and Third Circuits have declined to find standing based on an 
increased risk of identity theft absent corresponding allegations of actual or 
attempted access or misuse of personal information.38 The Sixth, Seventh, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, however, have recognized standing based solely on 
an increased risk of future identity theft.39 Most of the cases where the Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits found standing involved conduct deliber-
ately targeting personal information or attempts to use that information for 
nefarious purposes.40 Moreover, at least one case in both the Seventh and 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See, e.g., Attias, 865 F.3d at 620, 629 (finding standing based on the increased risk of iden-
tity theft following a data breach, holding, “[a] substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by 
virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken”). 
 38 See In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639 & n.19 (finding that the plaintiffs alleged a “material 
risk of harm” where two unencrypted laptops were stolen containing “highly personal” infor-
mation, where it appeared the laptops were targeted for the personal information contained on 
them, and at least one named plaintiff alleged he had already been a victim of identity theft as a 
result of the breach); Katz, 672 F.3d at 80 (refusing to find standing where plaintiff failed to iden-
tify “any incident in which her data has ever been accessed by an unauthorized person,” noting 
that, in cases where circuits that have found standing, plaintiffs all alleged actual misuse); Reilly 
v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding a failure to allege injury-in-fact where 
“appellants have alleged no misuse, and therefore, no injury,” noting that “no identifiable taking 
occurred; all that is known is that a firewall was penetrated[,]” and that there was “no evidence” 
that the hack was “intentional or malicious”); see also Beatty, supra note 1 (discussing that, in 
order to find standing, courts require that plaintiffs show more than merely that their data had been 
stolen, and must bring forth allegations and evidence of misuse, and economic damages). 
 39 See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629 (recognizing and applying the substantial-risk standard to find 
that the plaintiffs met their burden, noting “a substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by 
virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken”); P.F. Chang’s 
China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d at 967 (recognizing the imminence of future identity theft where 
customers’ credit card data was stolen from restaurant in a hack); Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388 
(“Where a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
hackers will use the victims’ data for the fraudulent purposes alleged in [the p]laintiffs’ complaint 
. . . . Thus, although it might not be ‘literally certain’ that [p]laintiffs data will be misused, there is 
a sufficiently substantial risk of harm that incurring mitigation costs is reasonable.”); Remijas, 794 
F.3d at 692, 693–94 (recognizing and applying both the certainly-impending standard and the 
substantial-risk standard to find plaintiffs met their burden where hackers attacked Neiman Mar-
cus with malware to steal credit card numbers, because “[p]resumably, the purpose of the hack is, 
sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those customers’ identities”); Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff employees’ in-
creased risk of future identity theft theory was a “credible threat of harm” for Article III purposes 
after the theft of a laptop containing unencrypted names, addresses, and social security numbers of 
97,000 employees); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (bank-
ing services applicants’ increased risk of harm theory satisfied standing requirements after “so-
phisticated, intentional and malicious” security breach of bank website compromised their person-
al information). 
 40 See Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388 (finding implicitly that the data breach was targeted at 
personal information); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693–94 (finding that hackers targeted Neiman Marcus 
with malicious software); Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (finding it sufficient to confer standing that a 
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Ninth Circuits involved at least one allegation of misuse or access of personal 
information by the thief.41 
B. Factual Background 
In Beck v. McDonald, two data breaches at the William Jennings Bryan 
Dorn Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“Dorn VAMC”) in Columbia, South 
Carolina compromised the personal information of approximately 9,400 
veterans.42 Following the breaches, two classes of plaintiffs brought suits 
against Dorn VAMC officials, and the Secretary of Veteran Affairs for viola-
tions of the Privacy Act and the APA, and various common law claims.43 In 
both cases, the plaintiffs sought to establish standing by contending that 
they suffered harm from the increased risk of, and cost required to prevent, 
future identity theft.44 The United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina dismissed both actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to allege a non-speculative, immi-
nent injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing.45 
The first breach involved the misplacement or theft of a laptop in Feb-
ruary 2013.46 The laptop held the unprotected private information of rough-
ly 7,400 patients.47 Following the loss of the laptop, Dorn VAMC offered all 
the potential victims one year of free credit monitoring.48 At the time of the 
court’s decision in Beck, the laptop had not been recovered.49 
                                                                                                                           
thief targeted a laptop containing encrypted personal information); Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632 
(finding hackers acted “intentional[ly]” and “malicious[ly]”). 
 41 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693–94 (noting that the plaintiffs are “careful to say that only 
9.200 [credit] cards have experiences fraudulent charges so far”); Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (not-
ing that one plaintiffs alleged actual misuse of personal information). The court, in support of its 
reasoning, distinguished Remijas and other data breach cases from Clapper, finding that, unlike 
the plaintiffs in Clapper, the data breach victims did not have to “speculate as to whether [their] 
information ha[d] been stolen and what information was taken,” the plaintiffs were already experi-
encing fraudulent charges on their credit cards and subsequently alleged that more were yet to 
come. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. In contrast, the Clapper plaintiffs could only speculate as to 
whether their communications would be acquired. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 411; Remijas, 794 F.3d at 
693. 
 42 Beck, 848 F.3d at 266. The breaches affected approximately 7,400 veterans in the first 
breach and approximately 2,000 in the second. Id. 
 43 Id. at 266–67. This Comment does not discuss the APA or common law claims. See infra 
notes 44–110 and accompanying text. 
 44 Beck, 848 F.3d at 267, 268. 
 45 Id. at 268–69. 
 46 Id. at 267. Although an internal investigation by Dorn VAMC determined the laptop was 
likely stolen, the court declined to make a finding on that issue. Id. at 275. 
 47 Id. at 275. 
 48 Id. In addition, Dorn VAMC conducted an internal investigation of the theft, concluding 
that the laptop was likely to have been stolen and that the Dorn VAMC failed to follow its own 
policies for securing patient information on laptops. Id. 
 49 Id. 
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The second breach was uncovered in July, 2014 when Dorn VAMC 
discovered that four boxes of pathology reports had been misplaced or tak-
en.50 The boxes contained the information of roughly 2,000 patients, includ-
ing their names, social security numbers, and medical histories.51 Just as it 
had after the first breach, Dorn VAMC offered one year of free credit moni-
toring to all potential victims.52 Similarly, at the time of the Beck decision, 
the boxes had not been found.53 
Following the first breach, named plaintiffs Richard Beck and 
Lakreshia Jeffrey (the “Beck plaintiffs”) sued on behalf of a putative class 
of roughly 7,400 victims whose information was contained on the laptop.54 
The Beck plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and monetary damages under 
the Privacy Act, alleging that the defendants’ failures wasted their time and 
money, embarrassed them, and increased their risk of identity theft.55 The 
Beck plaintiffs also sought an injunction under the APA ordering the VA to 
secure, and then destroy, the poorly kept records remaining in Dorn 
VAMC’s hands.56 
After the defendants moved for summary judgment, the United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the case for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Beck plaintiffs lacked standing 
under the Privacy Act because they failed to show that identity theft was im-
minent.57 Citing Clapper, the district court found that the risk of harm from 
future identity theft was theoretical, not imminent, because it would only oc-
cur if the court made assumptions about the actions of third parties.58 The 
district court further determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing because 
they failed to establish a substantial risk of harm.59 Additionally, the district 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 268. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 267. 
 55 Id. (alleging that “the ‘Defendants’ failures’ and ‘violations’ of the Privacy Act ‘caused 
Plaintiffs . . . embarrassment, inconvenience, unfairness, mental distress, and the threat of current 
and future substantial harm from identity theft and other misuse of their Personal Information’”) 
 56 Id. The Beck plaintiffs also brought separate common-law negligence claims. Id. The dis-
trict court granted the Dorn VAMC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, 
in the alternative, for failure to state a claim as to the common-law negligence claims, and de-
clined to dismiss the Privacy Act and APA claims at the pleadings stage. Id. 
 57 Id. at 267–68 (finding that the plaintiffs had “not submitted evidence sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether they face a ‘certainly impending’ risk of identity 
theft”). 
 58 Id. at 268 (noting that plaintiffs alleged harm was “contingent on a chain of attenuated 
hypothetical events and actions by third parties independent of the defendants”). 
 59 Id. (“The plaintiffs’ calculations that 33% of those affected by the laptop theft would have 
their identities stolen and that all affected would be 9.5 times more likely to experience identity 
theft ‘di[d] not suffice to show a substantial risk of identity theft.’”). 
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court rejected the Beck plaintiffs’ theory that paying to monitor their credit 
scores amounted to an injury because the underlying risk of harm was too 
speculative.60 
While the Beck class action was proceeding, Beverly Watson brought 
another putative class-action on behalf of the roughly 2,000 individuals af-
fected by the disappearance of the pathology reports.61 That suit alleged the 
same harm as the Beck plaintiffs.62 The district court also dismissed the 
Watson case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that Watson 
lacked Article III standing under the Privacy Act because she failed to al-
lege an actual or attempted misuse of the stolen information, thus her alle-
gation that her information would be misused was speculative.63 Both cases 
were consolidated on appeal by the Fourth Circuit.64 The Fourth Circuit was 
asked to review whether the increased risk of identity theft that the Beck 
and Watson plaintiffs alleged constituted an actual or imminent injury under 
Article III of the Constitution.65 
II. BECK SURVEYED THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND AVOIDED PICKING A SIDE BY 
DRAWING FACTUAL DISTINCTIONS 
This Part examines how the Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion that 
the occurrence of a data breach, alone, is insufficient to confer standing and 
that, in order to successfully plead an injury-in-fact, plaintiffs must show 
that thieves actually misused or attempted to misuse their stolen personal 
information.66 
In February 2017, in Beck v. McDonald, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined whether a plaintiff could establish 
Article III standing by alleging that harm was impending following two da-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. (rejecting the plaintiffs’ attempt to “create standing by choosing to purchase credit mon-
itoring services or taking any other steps designed to mitigate the speculative harm of future iden-
tity theft”). The district court also denied the Beck plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief under the 
APA, relaying on its previous analysis and holding that the injury was too speculative for the 
plaintiffs to assert that their information would again be compromised and that they would be 
injured as a result. Id. 
 61 Id. at 268–69. 
 62 Id. at 268. 
 63 Id. at 269. The district court also dismissed the claim for injunctive relief under the APA, 
concluding that Watson’s allegations based on Dorn VAMC’s prior conduct were insufficient to 
show that she would be at the mercy of future data breaches and thefts in the absence of an injunc-
tion. Id. 
 64 Id. at 266. 
 65 See id. at 269. 
 66 See infra notes 67–85 and accompanying text. 
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ta breaches.67 In reviewing the consolidated appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
framed the issue as whether the plaintiffs met Clapper v. Amnesty Interna-
tional USA’s injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing.68 Specifical-
ly, the court addressed whether the plaintiffs established that the threatened 
injury of identity theft was certainly impending or posed a substantial risk 
that harm would occur under the Privacy Act.69 
The court began its analysis by discussing the legal framework sur-
rounding the future-injury theory of Article III standing.70 Accordingly, the 
court concluded, without explanation, that Clapper controlled.71 The Fourth 
Circuit then addressed the plaintiffs’ contentions for Article III standing 
based on the increased risk of future identity theft and the cost of protecting 
against those risks.72 
The Fourth Circuit surveyed a five-circuit split to determine whether 
the increased risk of future identity theft could confer standing.73 Although 
acknowledging that it was possible to establish standing based on such risk, 
the court did not declare whether it is necessary to allege actual or attempt-
                                                                                                                           
 67 848 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2017). The court had to evaluate standing at both the pleading 
stage and the motion to dismiss stage, but narrowed the inquiry to the motion to dismiss stage as 
the bar was lower and would encapsulate the summary judgment dispute. Id. 
 68 Id. at 270–71; 568 U.S. 398 (2013). The court affirmed the district court’s dismissals for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs 
failed to establish injury-in-fact. Beck, 848 F.3d at 267. 
 69 Beck, 848 F.3d at 270–72, 275. 
 70 Id. at 270–72. 
 71 See id. at 272 (discussing the appropriate standard to apply when plaintiffs allege an im-
pending injury). The court mentioned that it would explain why it found Clapper to be controlling, 
but it does not appear like the court explicitly did. See id. (“Clapper[] . . . is controlling here. Be-
fore explaining why, we address the Plaintiffs’ contention that the district court misread Clapper 
to require a new, heightened burden.”). To the extent that the discussion was implicit, the court 
noted that the “certainly impending” standard articulated in Clapper was “hardly novel.” Id. (cit-
ing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 564–65 & n.2 (1992); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). Interestingly, 
the court found that plaintiffs’ “emotional upset” and “fear [of] identity theft and financial fraud” 
were insufficient to confer Article III standing—the court proceeded to limit its inquiry to a dis-
cussion of whether the increased risk of identity theft, alone, was sufficient to confer standing. Id. 
 72 Id. at 273. In discussing the cost of mitigative measures, the court piggybacked on its rea-
soning concerning the increased risk of identity theft to deny standing. See id. at 276–77 (citing 
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416) (finding the plaintiffs’ arguments about the cost mitigative measures to 
be “a repackaged version” of their prior standing argument). The court found that, because the 
threat of future harm was speculative, the measures taken to mitigate that harm were “self-
imposed” and could confer standing. Id. (citing Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409). For example, in support 
of its reasoning, the court cited Remijas for the proposition that mitigation costs do not satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement where the harm is not imminent. Id. (citing Remijas v. Neiman Marcus 
Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 73 See id. at 273 (noting that the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all recognized that 
plaintiffs can establish an injury-in-fact based on the increased risk of future identity theft and that 
the First and Third Circuits have rejected such contentions). 
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ed misuse at the motion to dismiss stage.74 The Fourth Circuit observed that 
other circuits have found standing when the plaintiffs alleged that data 
thieves intentionally targeted personal information.75Those circuits relied on 
allegations of hacking specifically into data bases that held credit card in-
formation or misuse of that personal information soon after the breach.76 
These factors were absent in the Beck case.77 Accordingly, the court found 
that the plaintiffs’ claims were too speculative to confer Article III standing 
and failed to meet the certainly-impending standard.78 The court drew simi-
larities to Clapper, namely, that in order for plaintiffs to suffer the harm 
they fear, the court would have to participate in the same game of connect-
the-dots that the Supreme Court previously rejected.79 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See id. at 273–74 (discussing the reasoning of the circuit courts but omitting to address the 
question). 
 75 See id. (discussing the reasoning of the circuit courts but omitting to address the question).  
 76 See id. at 275 (noting that threatened injuries become increasingly more speculative over 
time in the absence of actual misuse). For example, in support of its reasoning, the court cited 
Galaria, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 2016 concluded that 
plaintiffs’ increased risk of future identity theft theory established injury-in-fact after hackers 
targeted Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company’s network and stole personal information. Id. at 
274 (citing Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016)); Galaria, 
663 F. App’x at 388 (“Where a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable inference 
can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data for the fraudulent purposes alleged in 
Plaintiffs’ complaints.”). Similarly, in support of its reasoning, the Fourth Circuit cited Krottner, 
where the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2010 concluded, as a matter of 
first impression, that the plaintiffs’ increased risk of future identity theft theory was sufficient to 
confer Article III standing following the theft of an unencrypted laptop from Starbucks that con-
tained the personal information and social security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks 
employees, where at least one named plaintiff was the victim of someone attempting to open an 
account in her name using her social security number two months after the laptop theft. Beck, 848 
F.3d at 273–74 (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 77 Beck, 848 F.3d at 274. For example, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that, even after approx-
imately four years, the Beck plaintiffs had produced no evidence of unauthorized access, misuse, 
or identity theft, nor that the thief stole the laptop with the intent to misuse their private infor-
mation. Id. The court found that the Watson plaintiffs failed in the same manner. Id. at 274–75. 
 78 Id. at 274-75. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ counterargument—that there was “no need 
to speculate” because the plaintiffs had alleged actual theft of the laptop and pathology reports—
finding that the “mere theft,” alone, was not grounds for Article III standing. Id. at 275 (citing 
Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2007)). In support, the 
court cited Randolph for the proposition that plaintiffs must allege intent to misuse, target, or 
access their personal information and that a mere theft is insufficient. Id. 
 79 See id. at 275 (finding that, in both cases, the thieves must first target the personal infor-
mation, then select—amongst thousands of people—the personal information of the named plain-
tiffs and then successfully use that information maliciously). In Clapper, the Supreme Court de-
nied standing because it found that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm would only manifest if the Court 
made assumptions about the potential actions of third parties. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. For ex-
ample, the Court would have had to assume that (1) the government would decide to target the 
specific individuals relevant to the action; (2) the government would use the specific method com-
plained about for surveillance of those individuals; (3) the Article III judges on the Federal Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court would authorize those surveillances; and so on. Id. at 410. Similarly, the 
Fourth Circuit, in Beck, found that it was too speculative to imagine what the hackers wanted with 
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The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege that there was 
a substantial risk of harm.80 The plaintiffs claimed that 33% of data breach 
victims will eventually become victims of identity theft.81 The court found, 
without explicit explanation, that this statistic fell short of establishing a sub-
stantial risk of harm.82 The plaintiffs also alleged that, by offering free credit 
monitoring, the defendants effectively conceded the existence of a substantial 
risk of harm.83 The court declined to follow its sister circuits’ decisions to 
infer such harm from the offer, noting that such a decision would disincentiv-
ize businesses from offering those services again for fear of lawsuit. 84 Ac-
cordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show a substantial risk 
of harm posed by the data breaches.85 
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DECIDED THE CASE, BUT THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE STILL LEAVES PLAINTIFFS UNCERTAIN HOW TO PLEAD 
To say the least, standing has not been applied consistently, and stand-
ing in data breach cases is no exception.86 On one hand, it makes sense that 
people who target and steal personal information are likely to use it for ne-
                                                                                                                           
the stolen laptop or stolen pathology reports, whether they knew how to access the information, or 
whether they would even try to access the information. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274. 
 80 Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (citing Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 n.5). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See id. at 275–76 (finding that the statistic “falls far short” of establishing a substantial risk 
of harm). In support of its reasoning, the court cited Khan and In re Science Applications. Id. at 
276 (citing Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (D. Md. 2016); In re 
Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26 (D.D.C 
2014)). Both courts found a lack of standing where plaintiffs produced statistics that showed that 
approximately 20% of data breach victims are sure to become the victims of identity theft. Khan, 
188 F. Supp. 3d at 533; In re Sci. Applications, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 26. 
 83 Beck, 848 F.3d at 276. 
 84 Id. The court determined that, to use a business’s altruistic offers against it would provide a 
disincentive for those businesses to be altruistic in the future, thus opting not to use the offer of 
free credit monitoring against the defendants here. Id. But see Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388 (“In-
deed, Nationwide seems to recognize the severity of the risk, given its offer to provide credit-
monitoring and identity-theft protection for a full year”); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694 (“It is telling 
. . . that Neiman Marcus offered one year of credit monitoring and identity-theft protection to all 
[potentially harmed] customers . . . . It is unlikely that it did so because the risk is so ephemeral 
that it can safely be disregarded.”). 
 85 Beck, 848 F.3d at 276. The court, in dicta, noted that Clapper elucidated that a threatened 
event can be “reasonably likely” to occur but nonetheless fail to meet the “imminence” require-
ment for injury-in-fact. Id. (citing Clapper, 568 U.S. at 406–07). 
 86 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (discussing Article III standing generally, noting that Article III standing 
has not been defined consistently). Compare Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 
2012) (declining to find standing in the absence of allegations of actual misuse or harm), with 
Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding standing where plaintiffs 
allege breach of data). 
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farious purposes. 87 On the other hand, as time passes and no attempts to 
misuse the information have occurred, it becomes harder to claim that iden-
tity theft is imminent.88 
The Fourth Circuit in Beck correctly arrived at this conclusion.89 The un-
fortunate reality, however, is that data breach victims are now left asking how 
and when should they bring a lawsuit: what facts must be pleaded for their 
case to proceed; and should they wait until they have evidence of hackers 
trying to use their stolen information, or sue as soon as they hear that a breach 
has occurred?90 This Part argues that victims are left asking themselves those 
questions with no answer in sight.91 Specifically, this Part argues that the 
Fourth Circuit properly determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing and also 
identifies that, where data breaches occur from physical theft, like that of a 
laptop, plaintiffs seem to struggle the most to establish standing.92 
The Fourth Circuit correctly determined that the Beck and Watson 
plaintiffs failed to allege facts to make it plausible that their injuries were 
imminent.93 While evaluating whether identity theft was certainly impend-
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (commenting 
on the imminence of future identity theft as seeming to be the purpose for stealing information); 
WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBERSECURITY, supra note 2, at 20 (noting the inconsistencies amongst courts 
where plaintiffs allege increased risk of identity theft without actual or attempted misuse). 
 88 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958–60 (D. Nev. 2015) (finding that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing where years had passed without the plaintiffs making any allegations of 
misuse); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366–67 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (noting that a lapse 
of time undermines the concept of “imminent”). 
 89 See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing that plaintiffs have 
failed to show any indication their stolen personal information would be used in a way that would 
cause them harm just because a laptop and pathology reports were stolen). 
 90 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694 (noting the inherent difficulty in requiring data breach plain-
tiffs to wait for harm to manifest before bringing a lawsuit); see also WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBER-
SECURITY, supra note 2, at 20 (noting the difficult choices data breach victims have to make when 
deciding whether to bring a lawsuit and what to plead); Dowty, supra note 3, at 686–87 (noting a 
circuit split concerning the sufficiency of allegations required to confer standing); Lee & Ellis, 
supra note 28, at 180 (discussing the complexity of the relationship between proving an impend-
ing injury and proving that your case has been properly incubated such that it is “ripe” for trial). 
 91 See infra notes 93–110 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 93–110 and accompanying text. 
 93 Beck, 848 F.3d at 267 (denying plaintiffs standing where they suffered no economic harm 
as a result of having their personal information stolen by a laptop thief). This argument is made on 
the assumption that Clapper was correctly decided and applies in data breach class actions. See 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) (permitting a substantial risk theory). 
See generally Green, supra note 30 (discussing the possibility that the substantial risk test is a 
fiction created to secure Justice Kennedy’s vote). One might argue that Clapper’s effect does not 
quite reach private collection of private information, as Clapper was a case about a public collec-
tion of private information by the government through FISA. See, e.g., John L. Jacobus & Benja-
min B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty International and Data Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the 
Law “Certainly Impending”?, 21 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 3, 15, 50 (2014), https://scholarship.richmond.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1405&context=jolt [ http://perma.cc/9H8B-KSWW] (discussing 
the ensuing split between courts in the data breach sphere before and after Clapper, assuming, 
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ing, the court compared the plaintiffs’ allegations to cases where increased 
risks of identity theft were sufficient to confer standing.94 Accordingly, the 
court identified three failures within the plaintiffs’ case: (1) a lack of intent 
by the thieves to target the personal information of the victims; (2) a lack of 
attempt at misuse; and (3) a lack of actual misuse.95 Virtually no courts have 
granted standing in the absence of all three of the above allegations, and all 
three were missing in this case.96 Irrespective of whether allegations of ac-
tual misuse are required to confer standing, no court has been willing to 
label an identity theft “imminent” unless a thief, at the very least, targeted 
or attempted to misuse personal information within a reasonable amount of 
                                                                                                                           
without explanation, that Clapper properly applies in data breach cases). Courts are even torn as to 
the effect of Clapper in data breach cases. Compare In re Zappos, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 956 (citing 
In re Sony Gaming Networks & Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961 
(S.D. Cal. 2014)) (discussing Article III standing requirement, noting that, although Clapper did 
not use the Ninth Circuit’s “real and immediate” language, it “did not set forth a new Article III 
framework, nor did the Supreme Court’s decision overrule previous precedent requiring that the 
harm be ‘real and immediate’”), with Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 
878 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (discussing Clapper’s effect on future injury-in-fact, noting “Clapper ex-
pressly rejected the . . . ‘objectively reasonable likelihood standard’ as ‘inconsistent with our re-
quirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury-in-fact’”). Obvi-
ously, if it turns out that Clapper precludes increased risk theories for future identity theft, then the 
holding that the plaintiffs’ allegations of harm were too speculative was accurate. See Beck, 848 
F.3d at 274 (finding that the plaintiffs did not adequately plead an increased risk of identity theft). 
Compare Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (acknowledging the viability of a 
substantial risk theory of injury in fact), with Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 797 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(applying Clapper’s certainly impending standard, discussing the ambiguity in Clapper). Like-
wise, if Clapper is to be understood as allowing increased risk of injury theories to confer standing 
in the data breach context, then the Fourth Circuit was also correct to undertake the analysis and 
affirm the decision to dismiss the case. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (finding that plaintiffs failed to 
allege they were at an increased risk of identity theft following a data breach). Compare Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1549 (acknowledging the viability of a substantial risk theory of injury in fact), with 
Blum, 744 F.3d at 797 (applying Clapper’s certainly impending standard, discussing the ambigui-
ty in Clapper). 
 94 Beck, 848 F.3d at 274. 
 95 Id. (discussing the facts and rationale sister circuits employed when finding standing, not-
ing that “plaintiffs ma[d]e no such [similar] claims”); WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBERSECURITY, supra 
note 2, at 19 (listing a compilation of factors by which courts have found standing, and noting 
factors where the absences have been fatal to plaintiffs’ cases). 
 96 See WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBERSECURITY, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that, to even have a 
chance at a court finding standing, plaintiffs need to allege a minimum of data breach coupled 
with a statutory violation); Dowty, supra note 3, at 689–93 (surveying the circuit split and discuss-
ing the factors courts have discerned confer standing). Assuming that the pathology reports were 
stolen and not merely misplaced, one can argue that the thieves in Beck “targeted” the pathology 
reports for the social security numbers and medical history contained therein. See Beck, 848 F.3d 
at 268. Targeting the information notwithstanding, the passage of four years without a single inci-
dence of attempted misuse severely dampens a claim that future identity theft is imminent. See In 
re Zappos, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 958–60 (finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing where years had 
passed without the plaintiffs making any allegations of misuse); Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 366–67 
(noting that a lapse of time undermines the concept of “imminent”). 
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time following the breach.97 If there hasn’t been at least one unauthorized 
attempt at a person’s identity over four years since the data exposure, it is 
indefensible to claim that identity theft is still certainly impending.98 More-
over, the plaintiffs had not alleged that their medical insurance, credit cards, 
bank accounts, or other personal accounts had been subject to attempts at 
unauthorized access.99 
The Fourth Circuit was also correct that the plaintiffs’ argument con-
cerning the “substantial risk” of harm posed by the compromised laptop and 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding stand-
ing where a thief stole a laptop containing unencrypted personal information of over 97,000 Star-
bucks employees, where at least one plaintiff alleged misuse in the form of a fraudulent attempt to 
open a bank account); Attias, 865 F.3d at 623, 629 (finding standing where a thief stole two lap-
tops and subsequent misuse was alleged). Indeed, scholars have insinuated that the mere theft of 
information, by itself, poses no harm to the owner of the information without subsequent use; the 
use of personal information is what deprives the original owner of the information’s value, thus 
making it fair to say the victim had been harmed. See STUART P. GREEN, 13 WAYS TO STEAL A 
BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 244 (2012) (proposing that unless one’s stolen 
personal information is misused, it is hard to claim that the victim had been harmed). One scholar 
drew a useful analogy to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment: in instances of governmen-
tal takings, plaintiffs are compensated only when the takings “go too far.” Id. Similarly, identity 
theft won’t confer an injury unless the thief has gone “too far” and took steps towards depriving 
someone of property value. Id. For an example of when the government went “too far,” consider 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent a coal com-
pany from mining below their home to prevent the ground from collapsing beneath their feet. 260 
U.S. 393, 414–15 (1922). There, the issue was whether the coal company could be prevented from 
digging out the valuable coal support pillars that kept the ground from collapsing, or whether the 
preventative statute would amount to an impermissible regulatory taking by the government. Id. 
The court, finding for the coal company, decided that a statute that prevented the coal company 
from mining the remaining foundational coal would deprive the company of the subterranean 
property value, thus going “too far” and requiring compensation to the company for the loss as if it 
were a taking. Id. In Beck, the Fourth Circuit’s decision makes sense in light of this analogy: ac-
cepting the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, although thieves stole pathology reports containing, inter 
alia, names and social security numbers, there is something to be said for nearly four years pass-
ing without an instance of attempted misuse or actual misuse. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (noting a 
connection between the passing of time and the speculative nature of an allegedly impending 
harm); see also In re Zappos, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 958 (noting that the passage of time is a factor to 
weigh when considering how “impending” an alleged injury is, and that the more time passes, the 
more plaintiffs’ arguments are “undermined”). Because there was no harm, or an action that looks 
like an attempt to cause harm, plaintiffs should not be compensated. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 
(denying standing where the plaintiffs failed to allege that there had been any attempts by thieves 
to misuse their stolen information). 
 98 See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (noting that plaintiffs “uncovered no evidence that the infor-
mation contained on the stolen laptop has been accessed or misused”); In re Zappos, 108 F. Supp. 
3d at 958–60 (finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing where years had passed without the plain-
tiffs making any allegations of misuse); Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 366–67 (noting that a lapse of 
time undermines the concept of “imminent”). 
 99 Beck, 848 F.3d at 274. The court pointed out that the Beck plaintiffs could not have been 
the victims of credit or bank fraud because the stolen laptop did not contain any credit card or 
bank account information. Id. at 274 n.6. But see Attias, 865 F.3d at 628 (finding that the theft of 
merely a combination of names, birthdays, email addresses, and subscriber identification numbers 
could confer standing because the risk of medical insurance fraud was sufficiently high). 
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pathology reports carried little weight.100 The plaintiffs offered generalized 
statistics concerning identity theft following data breaches in the abstract.101 
As the court noted, these statistics provided no insight into the particular 
facts of the case.102 Absent particular assessments of the risks posed to these 
plaintiffs under the type of theft, it cannot be said that these victims face a 
“substantial risk” of harm.103 Moreover, the court properly chose not to in-
terpret Dorn VAMC’s offer to monitor the victims’ credit scores as proof of 
a “substantial risk.”104 As the court noted, it would be poor policy to slap an 
altruistic wrist as it might deter future benevolent attempts to mitigate po-
tential harm.105 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275–76 (denying plaintiffs standing where they failed to allege that 
identity theft would follow from the theft of a laptop and pathology reports); Clapper, 568 U.S. at 
410 (noting that “allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient” to confer standing (inter-
nal citations omitted)). Increased risk of identity theft, alone, may be sufficient to confer standing 
in certain circumstances. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 629 (finding that plaintiffs adequately pleaded 
injury-in-fact based on an increased risk of identity theft theory). For example, in Attias, an un-
known hacker breached twenty-two computers and accessed a database that contained customers’ 
credit card numbers and full social security numbers (as opposed to only the last four digits). Id. at 
623. The court, finding standing, reasoned that when a company collects personal information in 
the form of credit card and social security numbers, and that information is targeted and accessed, 
plaintiffs are at a high risk of financial fraud. Id. at 629. Of course, the court would have to make 
assumptions that the hacker who took that information would then use it for nefarious purposes. 
See, e.g., Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (“Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and 
steal customers’ private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to 
make fraudulent charges or assume those customers’ identities.”). Nevertheless, that assumption is 
much more sensible when the facts reveal that a hacker aimed their hack at that personal infor-
mation, rather than, for example, stole a laptop. Compare Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (noting that the 
mere theft of an item, alone, is insufficient to confer Article III standing, requiring that plaintiffs 
show allegations of attempted or actual misuse of the stolen personal information), with Remijas, 
794 F.3d at 693 (finding standing where hackers deliberately aimed their attack at personal credit 
card information and fraudulent credit card charges appeared on customers’ credit card statements 
soon thereafter). 
 101 Beck, 848 F.3d at 275–76. 
 102 See id. at 275 n.7 (noting that plaintiffs’ “general statistic [said] nothing about the risk 
arising out of any particular incident, nor does it address the particular facts of this case”). 
 103 Id.; see Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (D. Md. 2016) 
(noting that statistics, which are often cited in other cases of a similar sort, do not establish that 
identity theft is “certainly impending” in the instant case). It is simply too conjectural to apply 
generalized statistics to the facts of a case. Khan, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 533. 
 104 Beck, 848 F.3d at 276. But see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 
(6th Cir. 2016) (“Indeed, Nationwide seems to recognize the severity of the risk, given its offer to 
provide credit-monitoring and identity-theft protection for a full year.”); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 694 
(“It is telling . . . that Neiman Marcus offered one year of credit monitoring and identity-theft 
protection to all [potentially harmed] customers . . . . It is unlikely that it did so because the risk is 
so ephemeral that it can safely be disregarded.”). Offering free credit monitoring following a data 
breach is not an uncommon occurrence. See Regnier & Woolley, supra note 1 (noting that Equifax 
offered free credit-monitoring services following a breach). 
 105 Beck, 848 F.3d at 276; In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 
625, 634 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2017) (commenting that an offer by a company to monitor credit follow-
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The fallout from the Beck decision and the current circuit split is dis-
concerting: victims either have to wait for harm to materialize or allege—at 
the very least—that thieves specifically targeted their personal information 
to even have a shot at establishing standing.106 In instances of laptop thefts, 
it is difficult to imagine these cases proceeding past the standing phase on 
increased-risk theories without some allegations of actual harm or attempt-
ed misuse, forcing victims to wait before they can bring a lawsuit.107 The 
issue is particularly salient in laptop theft cases because the mere theft of a 
laptop does not necessitate that the thief wanted the information contained 
within.108 Even if victims can allege that the laptop was targeted for person-
al information, courts are inconsistent as to whether the mere targeting of 
personal information is sufficient to confer standing.109 This, in turn, will 
force victims to sit and wait for at least an attempt by a thief to access their 
personal information before filing a suit.110 
CONCLUSION 
In February 2017, in Beck v. McDonald, the Fourth Circuit held that al-
legations that a laptop and pathology reports were stolen did not mean that 
identity theft was imminent. The court further held that, even though personal 
information was contained within the stolen items, there was no evidence that 
the thief intended to use that personal information for nefarious purposes. 
This decision deepened a circuit split surrounding what allegations are suffi-
cient to show that identity theft is imminent following a data breach. Victims 
are now stuck between a rock and a hard place: they live in fear that their 
identities may be compromised at any minute, yet lack the standing to obviate 
their anxieties through judicial remedy. In a society that is ever-increasingly 
                                                                                                                           
ing a breach should not be seen as a “concession or recognition” that plaintiffs suffered an injury, 
or else companies may be disincentivized in future instances). 
 106 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (noting the traceability problem created by plaintiffs having 
to wait for harm to materialize before bringing a lawsuit); WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBERSECURITY, 
supra note 2, at 20 (same). 
 107 See, e.g., Attias, 865 F.3d at 629 (finding standing following the theft of two laptops where 
subsequent misuse was alleged); Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 
2012) (finding plaintiffs met the requirements of Article III standing where two unencrypted lap-
tops were stolen and sold to someone who had a history of dealing in stolen property, and where 
actual identity theft and misuse were alleged); Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (noting that a named 
plaintiff had someone try to open up a bank account in his name following the laptop theft). 
 108 See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (noting that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the laptop thief 
deliberately targeted their personal information). 
 109 Beatty, supra note 1, at 1290 (discussing that, in order to find standing, courts require that 
plaintiffs show more than merely that their data had been stolen, and must bring forth allegations 
and evidence of misuse, and economic damages). 
 110 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (noting the traceability problem created by plaintiffs having 
to wait for harm to materialize before bringing a lawsuit); WHAT’S “NEW” IN CYBERSECURITY, 
supra note 2, at 20 (same). 
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dependent on trusting businesses with our personal information, instances of 
data breach litigation are only bound to rise. Until the Supreme Court clarifies 
the requirements for injury-in-fact within the data breach context, plaintiffs 
will be continuously rolling the dice on whether they actually are harmed be-
fore they ever approach the merits of their claims. 
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